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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This present matter is an appeal by the Appellants, The Estate of Judy Duinoulin, 
deceased and by and through her personal representative and Joseph Dumoulin, an individual 
(hereinafter referred to as Appellants) from the entry Summary Judgment and the resulting 
Judgment that were entered by the lower court dismissing the case with prejudice on July 28, 
2009. The case involved the Appellants and CUNA Mutual Group. The Honorable Cheri C. 
Copsey District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District, granted CUNA Mutual Group's Motion for 
Summary Judgment by an Order filed July 22,2009 (R. Vol. I, p. 72). The District Court in its 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, reasoned the insurance policy (R. 
Vol. I, pp 13-19) purchased by the Appellants covered only accidental death, and the death of 
Judy Du~noulin was not an accident. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants filed their Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on October 2, 
2009 (R. Vol. I, pp. 6-24). The Defendants-Respondents filed their Answer on October 31,2008 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 25-3 1). The Defendants-Respondents filed Motion for Summary Judgment on 
April 20, 2009 (R. Vol. I, pp. 43-44). Consequently, the Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a Motion to 
Continue Su~ninary Judgment Hearing on June 5,2009 (R. Vol. I, pp. 57-58). On July 22,2009, 
The Honorable Cheri C. Copsey entered the Court's Order Granting the Defendants-Respondents 
Summary Judgment (R. Vo, I p. 72), with the Judgment of the Complaint to be dismissed with 
prejudice by Judge Copsey being filed on July 28, 2009 (R. Vol I, p. 74). 
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C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In October 2007, Joseph and Judy Dumoulin purchased a $40,000.00 group accidental 
death and accidental dismemberment insurance policy from CUNA Mutual Group (Certificate of 
Exhibits ({hereafter referred to C.E.}# 6, Exhibit A). The following is language taken from the 
group accidental death & accidental dismemberment insurance policy issued by CUNA Mutual 
Group (C.E. # 6 Exhibit A) germane in this case: 
1) Definitions: 
accident: An occurrence which is unexpected or unforeseen either as to its cause 
or as to its result (Page 2) 
accidental death: Death resulting form an injury, and occurring within 1 year of 
the date of the accident causing the injury (Page 2) 
injury, injuries: Bodily damage or hann which: (a) is caused directly by an 
accident and independently of all other causes; (b) is effected solely through 
external means; and (c) occurs while a covered person's insurance is in force 
under your certificate. 
On March 13, 2008, Mrs. Dumoulin went to West Valley Medical's emergency 
department (E.D.) with the chief complaint of dyspnea (shortness of breath). The patient had a 
multiple risk factors, evidenced by her medical history, which would predispose her to have a 
large variety of illnesses that could manifest as dyspnea. Her initial evaluation in the E.D. 
including her history, the abnormalities noted on physical examination, and concerning 
diagnostic studies all gave credence to a pathologic process occurring within her lungs. However 
the focus of the assessment and plan formulated by the admitting medical team gave little 
consideration to this. This was a missed opportunity for more diagnostic studies to be done as to 
find the cause of her dyspnea that eventually led to respiratory failure (C.E. # 3 7 6). 
On March 15Ih it was recognized that her pulmonary disorder needed M h e r  attention and 
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF page 2 
computed tomography (CT scan) of the chest was obtained. The radiologist reading this study 
stated that the lung parenchyma (lung tissue) was "profoundly" and "markedly" abnormal. Based 
on CT scan findings the radiologist felt as though an infectious process was the etiology along 
with other potential pathologic processes that needed follow up. There is nothing in the medical 
records to demonstrate that these findings, which require timely evaluation and intervention, 
were addressed with appropriate priority. (C.E. # 3 7 7). 
At nine o'clock in the evening on the 15" the patient began demonstrating signs of 
respiratory failure. The respiratory rate is considered one of the "vital signs" and is used in part 
as a reflection of a patient's respiralory status. Her respiratory rate throughout her hospital stay 
was typically in the realm of twenty-some breaths per minute. At nine p.m. it dramatically 
increased to 48 breaths per minute. This is extremely high and is not compatible with life for an 
extended period of time. 
Mrs. Dumoulin had an alarming respiratory rate for approximately 13 hours prior to her 
respiratory arrest. Initially this was not appropriately recognized (or acted on) by the nursing staff 
as a physician was not alerted to her condition until after 1:30 a.m. on March 16'~.  Once the 
physician was made aware of this appropriate action was not taken. Mrs. Dumoulin needed an 
emergent evaluation and management into what was assuredly impending respiratory doom. Had 
proper steps been taken it is believed that her outcome would have been extremely different. The 
autopsy report, which diagnosed her with a treatable condition, supports this view. (C.E. #3 7 9). 
Joseph Dumoulin and Judy Dumoulin were married for approximately 17 years. Prior to 
her hospitalization Judy Dumoulin had for approximately seven (7) years experienced a 
deterioration of her mental health. Judy Dumoulin was on medication for psychological 
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disorders for seven (7) years prior to her hospitalization at West Valley, in 2008. During her 
hospitalization which lasted five (5) days, Judy Dumoulin had become more disoriented. (C.E. # 
674) .  
Prior to her hospitalization, Mrs. Dumoulin was never on any oxygen support systems. 
Mrs. Dumoulin prior to her hospitalization never had any experience with oxygen lines being 
used for her well being (C.E. #6 7 7). 
11. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Was the District Court correct in entering the Order granting the Defendant-Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment? 
2. Was the District Court correct in determining that the policy language excluded the 
Appellants' claims for benefits under the policy? 
3. Was the Dishict Court correct in determining that the death of Judy Duinoulin was not an 
accident under the tenns of the insurance policy? 
4. Was the District Court correct in determining that the exclusions under the insurance 
policy barred the plaintiffs froin recovery pursuant to the insurance policy? 
5. Are the appellants entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to rules 40 and 41 of the 
Idaho Appellate Rules and Idaho Code 41-1839. 
11. ARGUMENT 
I .  THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANT- 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. The Standard of Review for an Order Granting a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
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On appeal from an order granting a party's motion for sumnary judgment, the appellate 
court employs the same standard of review that the trial court uses in ruling on the motion. 
Banner Life Insurance Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Id. 117, 123,206 P.3d 
481,487 (2009). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery 
documents before the court indicate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c); Banner Life 
Insurance Co., 147 Idaho at 123,206 P.3d at 487. The moving party canies the burden of proving 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. For the reason set forth below the Dishjct 
Court erred in granting summary judgment. 
B. The Insurance Policy Provisions Did Not Exclude the Appellants' Claims for 
Accidental Death Benefits. 
The district court was requested by the Respondent to determine that there were no 
inaterial disputed questions of fact in interrupting the relevant contract language in light of the 
facts surrounding the insured's death. The principle issue for the lower court was the 
construction and interruption of the contractual terms as well as the exclusions contained in the 
life insurance policies, that were applicable to the Appellants' claims in light of the facts in the 
record. In construing an insurance policy, the court must look to the plain meaning of the words 
to detennine if there are any ambiguities. This determination is a question of law if unambiguous. 
In resolving this question of law, the Court must construe the policy "as a whole, not by an 
isolated phrase." Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660,663, 
115 P.3d 751,754 (2005) (quoting Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434,437,18 
P.3d 956, 959 (2000)). "When interpreting insurance policies, this Court applies the general 
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rules of contract law subject to certain special canons of construction." Clark v. Prudential Prop. 
& Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538,540,66 P.3d 242,244 (2003). "The general rule is that, because 
insurance contracts are adhesion contracts, typically not subject to negotiation between the 
parties, any ambiguity that exists in the contract 'must be construed most strongly against the 
insurer."' Talbot, 133 Idaho at 432, 987 P.2d at 1047 (quoting Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. 
Roberts, 128 Idaho 232,235,912 P.2d 119, 122 (1996)). 
The Affidavit of Joseph Dumoulin, provided the court with the factual medical history of 
the insured, Judy Dumoulin. The deceased never had any need for an oxygen support system in 
the past (C.E. #6 1 7). The Affidavit of Stephen Bekanich established that the hospital failed to 
treat the insured. Specifically, the testimony of Dr. Bekanich provides commencing at 1 9 :  
Once the physician was made aware of this appropriate action was not taken. Mrs. 
Dumoulin needed an emergent evaluation and management into what was 
assuredly impending respiratory doom. Had proper steps been taken, your Affiant, 
believes her outcome would have been extremely different. The autopsy report, 
which diagnosed her with a treatable condition, supports this view. 
With reasonable inedical certainly, your Affiant renders the inedical opinion that 
had doctors and/or the hospital staff been properly conducted an emergent 
evaluation and follow through management as required by the appropriate 
standard of care Mrs. Dumoulin would have stabilized to an appropriate 
condition .... 
As she was not properly monitored we don't know how long she labored in this 
condition but judging by her clinical assessment and arterial blood gas at the time 
she was found, as well her subsequent clinical course and further diagnostic 
studies that it was for a significant period of time. Had these interventions taken 
place, all of which were within the resources of her care takers and the hospital to 
provide, it is hard to imagine that Mrs. Dumoulin would have not had a 
significantly different outcome (C.E. #3 19) .  
The Affidavit of Stephen Bekanich established that the hospital and doctors failed to treat 
the insured and that her death was preventable. The testimony of Dr. Bekanich established the 
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death was not due to natural causes but was due to lack of treatment and negligence. If as Dr. 
Stephen Bekanich states the death was preventable it was by its very circumstances accidental. 
Idaho Law construes insurance contracts in a light most favorable to the insured and in a 
manner which will provide full coverage for the indicated risks rather than to narrow its 
protection." Smith v. O/P Transp., 128 Idaho 697,700,918 P.2d 281,284 (1996). If the Court 
finds any ambiguities in the insurance policy, they must be construed against the insurer, Farmers 
Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Talbot, 133 Idaho 428,435,987 P.2d 1043, 1050 (1999); See also Forelnost 
Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 102 Idaho 138,627 P.2d 317 (1981) ("...insurance policies are to be construed 
most liberally in favor of recovery, with all ambiguities being resolved in favor of the insured"). 
If a policy is found to be ambiguous, then its interpretation is a question of fact. See Clark v. 
Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538,541,66 P.3d 242,245 (2003). 
In the case of State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Heinz, 136 Idaho 381,34 P.3d 429 (2001 
S.C.), our Supreme Court held: 
Idaho law governing the interpretation of insurance policies was set forth well by 
Justice Shepard in Moss v. Mid- American Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 
298,300,647 P.2d 754,756 (1982): 
"This Court has long recognized that insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, 
not subject to negotiation between the parties, and hence must be construed most 
strongly against the insurer (citations omitted). The provision at issue today is one 
which seeks to exclude the insurer's coverage. Such an exclusion inust be strictly 
construed in favor of the insured (citations omitted). Hence, the courts have held 
that the burden is on the insurer to use clear and precise language if it wishes to 
restrict the scope of its coverage. 
A provision that seeks to exclude the insurer's coverage inust be strictly construed in 
favor of the insured. Moss v. Mid-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298,300,647 P.2d 
754, 756 (1982). The "burden is on the insurer to use clear and precise language if it wishes to 
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restrict the scope of its Coverage." Arreguin V. Farmers Ins. Co. Of Idaho, 180 P.3d 498 (ID 
2008). 
An insurance policy is ambiguous when it is reasonably subject to differing 
interpretations. Annstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 143 Idaho 135, 137, 139 P.3d 737,739 
(2006). Furthennore, a provision excluding coverage is strictly construed in favor of the insured 
and the insurer has the burden to use clear and precise language if it is restricting the scope of its 
coverage. Moss, 103 Idaho at 300, 647 P.2d at 756. Exclusions not stated with specificity will 
not be presumed or inferred. Clark v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541,66 
P.3d 242,245 (2003). 
In the present case the insurance company has chosen the tenn "no benefit will be paid 
for any loss or covered injury that: ..... is due to any disease, sickness, bodily or mental illness, or 
complication resulting from any medical treatment, surgery, pregnancy or childbirth". As 
established by Dr. Bekanich, there was no on going treatment. 
An accident as defined by the policy is "an occurrence which is unexpected or 
unforeseen either as to its cause or as to its result" (C.E. #6). In Bergkamp v. Carico, 101 Idaho 
365,613 P.2d 376 (1980) our Supreme Court stated, "where the terms of a contract are 
ambiguous, its interpretation and meaning is a question of fact and extrinsic evidence may be 
considered in attempting to arrive at the tnte intent of the contracting parties." In the case of 
Bondy v. Levy, 121 Id. 993,829 P.2d 1342, (1992) our Supreme Court observed, "...in 
determining whether a contract is ambiguous, our task is to ascertain whether the contract is 
reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." citing Spencer-Steed v. Spencer, 115 Id. 338, 
766 P.2d 1219 (1988); Delancyv. Delancy, 110 Id. 63,714 P.2d 32 (1986). 
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The clear mandate is for the court to: "...determine what a reasonable person in the 
position of the insured would have understood the language to mean. " Kromrei v. AID Ins. 
Co.(Mutual), 110 Id. 549, 551, 716 P.2d 1321, 1323 (1986); Permann v. Nationwide 108 Id. 
192, 194 697 P.2d 1206,1208 (1985); Burgess Farms v. New Hamushire Insurance Group, 108 
Id. 831 834,702 P.2d 869,872 (Ct. App. 1985). 
As Dr. Bekanich stated that "had doctors andlor the hospital staff been properly 
conducted an emergent evaluation and follow through management as required by the 
appropriate standard of care Mrs. Dumoulin would have stabilized to an appropriate 
condition"(C.E. #3 7 9). The relevant policy definition provides: "accident: An occurrence 
which is unexpected or unforeseen either as to its cause or as to its result" (C.E. # 6 policy page 
2). An average consumer would expect that proper treatment at a hospital would be 
administered, and it would be unexpected andlor unforeseen by a consumer not to receive proper 
medical treatment. 
The plain meaning of the term negligence to an average consumer would be equivalent to 
the teim accident. By way of analogy, an average person would describe an event of two 
vehicles colliding as an accident. Typically when two vehicles collide there is a negligent party 
who has caused the event. The same result should be obtained under the language drafted by 
CUNA in its definition of accident, to wit: negligence is tantamount to accident. The entry of 
summary judgment was in error as there existed a dispute of material fact relating to Judy 
Dumoulin's death being an accident under the terms of the policy. 
C. The District Court was incorrect in determining that the exclusion under the 
insurance policy barred the Appellants from recovery pursuant to the insurance 
policy. 
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The District Court ruled that a certain exclusion in the policy applied to defeat the 
Appellants' claims. The Appellants maintain that the term "medical or surgical treatment" is 
ambiguous because it allows for two reasonable constructions. There are a number of possible 
interruptions of the provision "medical treatment". One construction could mean that all medical 
treatment, no matter how skillfully or unskillfully performed, is covered by that phrase. For 
example patently negligent treatment, such as amputating the wrong leg, could be a reasonable 
interruption. Another construction, could mean that improper treatment, or malpractice, which is 
an accident, is not included within the meaning of "medical treatment". Furthermore as 
provided by Dr. Bekanich, treatment was not undertaken. There was no change in prescriptions 
for example. When nothing is prescribed there is no treatment. When nothing is operated upon 
there is no treatment. When nothing is treated there is no treatment. The exclusion for "medical 
treatment" cannot apply. 
The Appellants contend, therefore, that because there are at least two reasonable 
constructions of the phrase "medical or surgical treatment," the phrase is ambiguous and, thus, in 
accordance with familiar legal principles cited, should be construed in favor of the Appellants, 
and should be determined by a jury. There clearly was no death as a result of any complication 
from medical treatment or surgery as the Respondent asserted. 
The exclusion term "medical treatment" was relied upon by the Respondent as one of its 
basis for the motion for summary judgment. The term "medical treatment" is ambiguous as the 
facts of this very case establish. The case of Dinkowitz v. Prudential Insurance Co., 90 N.J. 
Super. 181, 16 A.2d 613 (N.J. Super Law Div. 01/14/1966) dealt with the interplay between an 
exclusion within an accidental death benefit policy and alleged medical malpractice. The 
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF page 10 
Dinkowitz, supra case, in defining medical and surgical treatment, stated "what is done by a 
physician of any recognized type or by a surgeon in diagnosing a bodily ailment and seeking to 
alleviate or cure it." ( 90 N.J. Super. 186). J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 5 415, 
provides: "'The expression "medical and surgical treatment" when used in the contract, includes 
all acts done by a physician in the preliminary care, general treatment or later care in order to 
effect a cure. . . . "'. 
The Affidavit of Dr. Bekanich establishes that the hospital, doctors, and support staff 
failed to develop a course of treatment in order to effect a cure. There was no attempt by the 
hospital to alleviate the condition or cure it. This death was not a result of complications. The 
logical conclusion to be drawn by the insurer's language may relate to those deaths, for example 
that occurred on a surgical table, not for deaths resulting from inaction. The Respondent had the 
opportunity in drafting its accidental death policy to specifically exclude medical malpractice as a 
non-accidental death. It did not do so and summary judgment was iinproperly entered. 
11. THE APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO RULES 40 AND 41 OF THE IDAHO APPELLATE RULES. 
Pursuant to I.A.R. Rule 41, an award of attorney fees on appeal is appropriate, when the 
prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees at the trial court level, pursuant to LC. 12-120 or I.C. 
12-121, see generally, G a g s  v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228,775 P.2d.120 (1989); Svidell v. Jenkins, 
11 1 Idaho 857, 727 P.2d 1285 (1986); Building Concepts v. Pidcxmg, 114 Idaho 640,759 P.2d 
93 1 (1988); Robinson v. Joint School District No. 331, 105 Idaho 487,670 P.2d 894 (1983). 
In this case Idaho Code 5 41-1 839 provides the court with the appropriate standard for 
the determination of attorneys fees. 
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Idaho Code, 5 41-1 839 provides in relevant provisions: 
ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEY FEES IN SUITS AGAINST INSURERS. 
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of statute to the contrary, this section 
and section 12-123, Idaho Code, shall provide the exclusive remedy for the award 
of statutory attorney's fees in all actions between insureds and insurers involving 
disputes arising under policies of insurance. Provided, attorney's fees inay be 
awarded by the court when it finds, from the facts presented to it that a case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. 
Section 12-120, Idaho Code, shall not apply to any actions between insureds and 
insurers involving disputes arising under any policy of insurance. 
Specific Idaho legislation has provided the framework for this court to analysis a request 
for attorney fees relating to an insurance policy. That pursuant to the specific provision, the 
Appellants are entitled to attorneys fees at the trial level and the appellate level. 
111. CONCLUSION 
The Appellants presented sufficient factual evidence to warrant a jury trial. The District 
Court was in error in determining that Judy Dumoulin's death was not an accident as defined by 
the policy language. There were no exclusions which applied to defeat the Appellants' rights to 
benefits under the policy. Furthermore the Appellants should ultimately be awarded their 
attorneys fees and costs at the trjal level and the appellate level. 
DATED this $ g o f  January, 2010 P 
Attorney for THE ESTATE OF JUDY 
DUMOULIN, Deceased, by and through her 
Personal Representative and JOSEPH DUMOULIN 
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J. Kevin West & Sally Reynolds ( ) U.S.Mai1 
Hall, Farley, Obemecht & Blanton, P.A. (X) Facsimile Translnission 
702 West Idaho Street, Suite 700 ( ) HandDeXivery 
Post Office Box 1271 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1271 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
THOMAS G. M 
~ t t ~ m e y  for 
DUMOULIN, Deceased, by and through her 
Personal Representative and JOSEPH DUMOULIN 
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